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)
)
Plaintiff-Respondent,
)
)
v.
)
)
RICHARD LEE BROWN,
)
)
Defendant-Appellant.
)
________________________________)

NO. 37640

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
This case raises a question of first impression requiring this Court to interpret
Idaho Code § 18-8311(1). Mr. Brown pled guilty to failure to register as a sex offender.
A day before he was sentenced in this case, the Honorable Cheri Copsey revoked
Mr. Brown‟s probation in a separate case stemming from Mr. Brown‟s prior guilty plea to
grand theft, and Judge Copsey retained jurisdiction. (See Order Revoking Probation
and Imposing Sentence and Further Retaining Jurisdiction, entered in Ada County Case
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Number CR-FE-2007-000429, file stamped on April 22, 2010).1 The Honorable Mike
Wetherell presided over the present case, interpreted the language of I.C. § 18-8311 to
require the court to relinquish Judge Copsey‟s jurisdiction, and executed a unified
sentence of eight years, with one year fixed, to be served consecutively to the sentence
executed by Judge Copsey. (See Order Vacating Sentence, Revoking Probation and
Imposition of Sentence and Commitment, entered in Ada County Case Number CR-FE2007-000429, file stamped on April 27, 2010).

The Honorable Judge Wetherell,

presiding over the case at hand, interpreted I.C. § 18-8311(1) as requiring the court to
re-revoke Mr. Brown‟s probation in the grand theft case and execute the sentence, and
further interpreted the statute as depriving the court the authority to retain jurisdiction
upon the failure to register conviction.

Mr. Brown asserts that the district court

incorrectly interpreted I.C. § 18-8311(1) and abused its discretion by failing to recognize
its own discretion to retain jurisdiction and that this Court must vacate his conviction and
remand the case for further proceedings.

Statement of the Facts & Course of Proceedings
The State filed a Complaint alleging that Mr. Brown had committed the crime of
failure to register as a sex offender. (R., pp.5-6.) Mr. Brown waived his right to a
preliminary hearing, was bound over into the district court, and an Information was filed
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Contemporaneously with this Brief, Mr. Brown has filed a Motion Requesting that the
Court Take Judicial Notice of Judge Copsey‟s Order Revoking Probation and Imposing
Sentence and Further Retaining Jurisdiction, entered in Ada County Case Number CRFE-2007-000429, file stamped on April 22, 2010, and Judge Wetherell‟s Order Vacating
Sentence, Revoking Probation and Imposition of Sentence and Commitment, entered in
Ada County Case Number CR-FE-2007-000429, file stamped on April 27, 2010. The
motion is pending.
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charging him with the above crime. (R., pp.10-16.) Mr. Brown eventually pled guilty to
an Amended Information which modified the obligation that Mr. Brown allegedly failed to
meet. (R., pp.18-19; Tr., p.1, L.1 – p.16, L.11.) In exchange for his guilty plea and
agreeing to cooperate in the presentence investigation, the State agreed to recommend
no more than ten years, with two years fixed. (Tr., p.1, L.1 – p.3, L.21.)
At the beginning of the sentencing hearing, the district court informed Mr. Brown
of the maximum sentence and stated, “[t]hat sentence must be consecutive to any
sentence currently being served.

And if you are on probation or other supervised

release, probation of the supervised release must be revoked and the sentence
imposed consecutively to any sentence that you are on supervised release for.”
(Tr., p.17, Ls.13-19.) The district court was informed that Judge Cospey had revoked
Mr. Brown‟s probation, executed sentence, and retained jurisdiction in CR-FE-2007000429, a conviction stemming from Mr. Brown‟s guilty plea to grand theft. (Tr., p.23,
Ls.15-18; see also 5/23/2007 Presentence Investigation Report, p.1.) The parties made
their sentencing recommendations and discussed with the district court the meaning of
I.C. § 18-8311, including whether the district court had the jurisdiction to revoke
probation in Judge Copsey‟s case, and whether the district court had the discretionary
authority to retain jurisdiction in the present case. (Tr., p.23, L.15 – p.44, L.17.)
The district court interpreted I.C. § 18-8311(1) as a legislative grant of limited
jurisdiction requiring a district court with jurisdiction over the failure to register case, to
revoke a defendant‟s probation in a case over which the district court did not previously
have jurisdiction. (Tr., p.48, L.9 – p.50, L.14.) The court continued:
So I‟m going to impose as per the plea agreement one year fixed,
seven years indeterminate for a total of eight. I‟m going to make that
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sentence consecutive to the sentence imposed in case H0700429; now
designated as case CRFE-2007-000429. I‟m going to grant the defendant
credit for time served of 74 days against the fixed portion of the sentence.
I am going to revoke the defendant‟s probation in case CRFE-2007000429. I‟m going to make it clear on this record that I am only revoking
that probation and imposing that underlying sentence because I believe it
is mandatory upon me to do so in this case under the provisions of Idaho
Code Section 18-8311. And if the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court
of the State of Idaho wish to construe this statute differently it is going to
have to be them that does so because I believe at least that it is clear that
that is what I‟m required to do and that the jurisdiction is conferred upon
me to do that in this case, in this type of case only, with regard to any
outstanding probation or parole.
(Tr., p.50, L.15 – p.51, L.12.) Defense counsel asked the district court to clarify whether
it believed that it had the authority under the statute to “impose the sentence in Judge
Copsey‟s case” to which the Court replied, “I believe that I am required to revoke the
probation in that case and to impose the underlying sentence in this case consecutively
to that case.” (Tr., p.52, L.19 – p.53, L.4.) Defense counsel further asked whether the
district court believed that it was “not allowed under this statute to retain jurisdiction in a
case of this type” to which the court replied, “I am making a determination that based
upon what the statutes states that I do not feel that I have the authority to retain
jurisdiction.” (Tr., p.53, Ls.5-12.) Mr. Brown filed a timely Notice of Appeal from the
district court‟s Judgment of Conviction and Commitment. (R., pp.24-30.)

ISSUE
Did the district court abuse its discretion when it imposed upon Mr. Brown a unified
sentence of eight years, with one year fixed, following Mr. Brown‟s guilty plea to failure
to register as a sex offender, as the court failed to recognize that it had the authority to
retain jurisdiction?
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ARGUMENT
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Imposed Upon Mr. Brown A Unified
Sentence Of Eight Years, With One Year Fixed, Following Mr. Brown‟s Guilty Plea To
Failure To Register As A Sex Offender, As The Court Failed To Recognize That It Had
The Authority To Retain Jurisdiction

A.

Introduction
The district court falsely interpreted I.C. § 18-8311(1) to preclude the court from

retaining jurisdiction. By failing to recognize that it had discretion to retain jurisdiction,
the district court abused its discretion and Mr. Brown‟s sentence should be vacated and
his case remanded to the district court.

B.

Standard Of Review
“Statutory interpretation is a question of law over which [an appellate] Court

exercises free review.” State v. Grazian, 144 Idaho 510, 513, 164 P.3d 790, 793 (2007)
(citing McLean v. Maverik Country Stores, Inc., 142 Idaho 810, 813, 135 P.3d 756, 759
(2006)). The Grazian Court continued:
Statutory interpretation “must begin with the literal words of the statute”
and these words “must be given their plain, usual, and ordinary meaning.”
McLean, 142 Idaho at 813, 135 P.3d at 759. The plain language is
“always to be preferred to any curious, narrow hidden sense.” State v.
Mercer, 143 Idaho 108, 109, 138 P.3d 308, 309 (2006). “Unless the result
is palpably absurd, this Court assumes that the legislature meant what is
clearly stated in the statute.” State v. Rhode, 133 Idaho 459, 462, 988
P.2d 685, 688 (1999). When the language is plain and unambiguous,
statutory interpretation is not necessary. Hayden Lake Fire Protection
Dist. v. Alcorn, 141 Idaho 307, 312, 109 P.3d 161, 166 (2005). Statutory
language may be plain even if the parties present different interpretations
to the court; ambiguity only occurs where “reasonable minds might differ
as to interpretations.” Id.
Id.
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“„Where a sentence is within statutory limits, an appellant has the burden of
showing a clear abuse of discretion on the part of the court imposing the sentence.‟”
State v. Jackson, 130 Idaho 293, 294, 939 P.2d 1372, 1373 (1997) (quoting State v.
Cotton, 100 Idaho 573, 577, 602 P.2d 71, 75 (1979)). When an exercise of discretion is
reviewed on appeal, the appellate court conducts a multi-tiered inquiry. The sequence
of the inquiry is: (1) whether the lower court rightly perceived the issue as one of
discretion; (2) whether the court acted within the outer boundaries of such discretion
and consistently with any legal standards applicable to specific choices; and (3) whether
the court reached its decision by an exercise of reason. State v. Hedger, 115 Idaho
598, 600; 768 P.2d 1331, 1333; (1989), (citing Associates Northwest, Inc. v. Beets, 112
Idaho 603, 605, 733 P.2d 824, 826 (Ct. App. 1987)).

C.

By The Plain, Usual , And Ordinary Meaning Of The Words Contained Therein,
Idaho Code § 18-8311(1) Does Not Preclude A District Court From Retaining
Jurisdiction After Imposing A Sentence Pursuant To The Statute
Idaho Code § 18-8311(1) reads as follows:
An offender subject to registration who fails to register, verify his address,
or provide any notice as required by this chapter shall be guilty of a felony
and shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison system for a
period not to exceed ten (10) years and by a fine not to exceed five
thousand dollars ($5,000). If the offender is on probation or other
supervised release or suspension from incarceration at the time of the
violation, the probation or supervised release or suspension shall be
revoked and the penalty for violating this chapter shall be served
consecutively to the offender's original sentence.

I.C. § 18-8311(1). This statute requires three things of the district court: 1) it requires
the court to sentence a defendant to a term of imprisonment not to exceed ten years; 2)
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assuming the court has jurisdiction to do so,2 it requires the district court to revoke the
offender‟s probation; and 3) where a prior term of probation was revoked, it requires the
district court to impose the sentence for failure to register as a sex-offender to run
consecutively to the sentence imposed upon revocation of the defendant‟s probation.
Section 18-8311(1) says nothing about depriving the district court of the ability to retain
jurisdiction pursuant to I.C. § 19-2601(4).
Idaho Code § 18-8311(1) specifically uses the term “probation or other
supervised release or suspension from incarceration.”

2

I.C. § 18-8311(1).

Both

The district court‟s interpretation of this clause as a legislative grant of jurisdiction over
a probation case, to the district court presiding over the failure to register case, while not
inconsistent with the words of statute itself, would lead to “palpably absurd” results. For
example, under the district court‟s interpretation, if the defendant‟s probation was from
another state or from a federal court, a district court sitting in Idaho would have the
authority and, in fact, would be required to revoke that probation – a grant of authority
the Idaho legislature lacks the power to provide. Furthermore, by this interpretation, the
district court would be required to revoke the defendant‟s probation even if the
defendant‟s due process rights to notice of, and opportunity to be heard on, the alleged
probation violation were never realized. See Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973).
The more likely interpretation is that the legislature intended this section to be limited to
cases where the district court presiding over the failure to register case already had
jurisdiction over the defendant‟s probation, i.e., where a defendant is convicted of a
registerable offense, the defendant was placed on probation, and the defendant
subsequently violates the terms of his probation by committing the new crime of failure
to register as a sex-offender. While this statute does not explicitly state which of these
interpretations are correct, unlike the district court‟s interpretation, an interpretation
limiting this provision to cases where the district court previously had jurisdiction over
the probation violation case, is not inconsistent with basic due process rights and a
basic understanding of the structure of government in the United States. Mr. Brown
filed a Notice of Appeal 146 days after Judge Copsey‟s order retaining jurisdiction,
argued that Judge Wetherell‟s order was void for lack of jurisdiction, and argued that the
Notice of Appeal was, therefore, timely. See Response to Conditional Dismissal
(docket number 38048). However, this Court nevertheless dismissed the appeal from
Judge Copsey‟s order as untimely. See Order dismissing appeal as untimely (docket
number 38048). Therefore, Mr. Brown does not raise as a separate issue on appeal
that the district court lacked the jurisdiction to re-revoke his probation and execute his
sentence in Ada County Case Number CRFE-2007-000429.
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I.C. § 19-2601(2) and § 19-2601(3) discuss a district court‟s power to “place the
defendant on probation.” I.C. § 19-2601(2)-(3). However, Idaho Code § 19-2601(4)
(2009)3 allowed a district court to execute a sentence, but retain jurisdiction for the first
180 days, and, within that 180 days, further allowed the district court to suspend the
remainder of the sentence and place the defendant on probation.

I.C. § 19-

2601(4)(2009). Idaho Code § 18-8311(1) contains no mention whatsoever of the ability
of the district court to retain jurisdiction as described in I.C. § 19-2601(4), let alone a
specific rebuke of its language. The plain, usual, and ordinary meaning of the words
contained I.C. § 18-8311(1) have no impact on a district court‟s power to retain
jurisdiction pursuant to I.C. § 19-2601(4).

1.

The Clause “Shall Be Punished By Imprisonment,” Does Not Negate A
District Court‟s Ability To Retain Jurisdiction

Although I.C. § 18-8311(1) speaks in apparent mandatory terms by stating that a
defendant convicted of failing to register as a sex-offender “shall be punished by
imprisonment,” this language does not limit the district court‟s inherent power to
suspend a sentence after a period of retained jurisdiction. In State v. Pena-Reyes, 131
Idaho 656, 962 P.2d 1040 (1998), the defendant challenged the constitutionality of a
statute which “imposes a mandatory minimum sentence of five years for a guilty plea to
trafficking in cocaine, which „shall not be suspended, deferred, or withheld.‟” Id. The
Idaho Supreme Court held as follows:
The Idaho Supreme Court, in State v. McCoy, 94 Idaho 236, 486 P.2d 247
(1971), held the judiciary had the inherent right to suspend sentences. In
1978, in response to McCoy, the legislature proposed and the people
3

Effective July 1, 2010, I.C. § 19-2601 has been amended to allow a district court to
retain jurisdiction for a period of 365 days. I.C. § 19-2601(2010).
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adopted an amendment to Article 5, Section 13, of the Idaho Constitution,
which added the following language: “provided, however, that the
legislature can provide mandatory minimum sentences for any crimes, and
any sentence imposed shall be not less than the mandatory minimum
sentence so provided. Any mandatory minimum sentence so imposed
shall not be reduced.” Idaho Const. art. V, § 13. This amendment
effectively circumscribes the power of our courts to suspend a mandatory
minimum sentence contained in a statute enacted pursuant to the
authority of our constitution.
Id. at 657, 962 P.2d at 1041 (citations in original). In sum, Idaho Courts have inherent
authority to suspend a sentence that can be circumvented solely where the legislature
has enacted a statute specifically prescribing a mandatory minimum term.

The

legislature has on occasion chosen to enact such legislation but, when doing so, has
explicitly stated its intention to circumvent the district court‟s inherent authority to
suspend a sentence.

For example, as was noted in Pena-Reyes, supra, Idaho

Code § 37-2732B(a)(8) reads as follows:
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, with respect to any person
who is found to have violated the provisions of this section, adjudication of
guilt or the imposition or execution of sentence shall not be suspended,
deferred, or withheld, nor shall such person be eligible for parole
prior to serving the mandatory minimum fixed term of imprisonment
prescribed in this section. Further, the court shall not retain
jurisdiction.
I.C. § 37-2732B(a)(8). In contrast, I.C. § 18-8311(1) neither delineates a mandatory
minimum sentence wherein the district court is specifically precluded from suspending,
deferring or withholding the execution of the sentence, nor explicitly states that a district
court cannot retain jurisdiction. Thus, in enacting I.C. § 18-8311(1), the legislature did
not announce an intention to circumscribe a district court‟s inherent authority to suspend
a sentence or retain jurisdiction.
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Furthermore, even if I.C. § 18-8311(1) could be interpreted as a legislative act
eliminating a district court‟s inherent authority to suspend a sentence from the outset,
while not violating Article 5 § 13 of the Idaho Constitution, its plain language does not
eliminate a district court‟s authority to retain jurisdiction and later suspend the sentence
and place the defendant on probation.

Where a defendant is convicted of violating

I.C. § 18-8311(1), the defendant “shall be punished by imprisonment in the state
prison system for a period not to exceed ten (10) years and by a fine not to exceed
five thousand dollars ($5,000).” I.C. § 18-8311(1) (emphasis added). A district court
retaining jurisdiction under I.C. § 19-2601(4), in fact, orders the defendant to be
imprisoned in the state prison system for up to 365 days (with the possibility of an
additional 30) – a period that does not exceed 10 years. I.C. § 19-2601(4). The plain,
usual, and ordinary meaning of I.C. § 18-8311(1) allows the district court to retain
jurisdiction.

D.

The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Failing To Recognize That It Had The
Authority To Retain Jurisdiction
When asked by defense counsel whether the district court believed that it was

not allowed to retain jurisdiction to which the court replied, “I am making a determination
that based upon what the statutes states that I do not feel that I have the authority to
retain jurisdiction.” (Tr., p.53, Ls.5-12.) As argued in Section I(C) above, a district court
has authority under I.C. § 19-2601(4) to retain jurisdiction and that authority is not
circumvented by I.C. § 18-8311(1). In short, the district court got the law wrong and

10

failed to recognize that it had the discretion to retain jurisdiction.4 By failing to recognize
that it had the discretion, the district court abused its discretion and the judgment of
conviction must be vacated and the case remanded to the district court for further
proceedings. Cf. State v. Torres, 107 Idaho 895, 898, 693 P.2d 1097, 1101 (Ct. App.
1984) (finding that “when a judge unduly narrows the scope of his discretion, by
focusing upon improperly limited information, the proper appellate response is not to
usurp such discretion by exercising it ourselves; rather, the proper course is to remand
the case for reconsideration.”).

CONCLUSION
Mr. Brown respectfully requests that this vacate the district court‟s Judgment of
Conviction and Commitment and remand the case to the district court for further
proceedings.
DATED this 27th day of December, 2010.

_________/s/________________
JASON C. PINTLER
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
4

Arguably, the district court further abused its discretion by failing to reach its ultimate
decision through an exercise in reason. While recognizing that Judge Copsey had
already, in fact, revoked Mr. Brown‟s probation in the grand theft case (Tr., p.49, Ls.1114), the court nevertheless re-revoked Mr. Brown‟s probation, this time relinquishing
Judge Copsey‟s jurisdiction. (Tr., p.50, L.22 – p.51, L.4.) Reason dictates that once a
defendant‟s probation has been revoked and the district court retains jurisdiction, a
second district court who had never presided over the first case cannot re-revoke
probation and relinquish jurisdiction. In essence, Judge Wetherell “reconsidered,” or
perhaps acted as an appellate court in reversing Judge Copsey‟s exercise of discretion,
where neither party had asked the court to do so. However, as noted in footnote 2
above, due to this Court‟s dismissal of Mr. Brown‟s appeal from Ada County Case
Number CRFE-2007-000429, the district court‟s failure to exercise reason in this regard
is not raised as a specific issue in this case.
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